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AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFIT ADEQUACY
ABSTRACT
Traditionally studies of unemployment insurance benefit adequacy have relied on an expenditure
survey.  This is expensive, yields small samples, and presumes that the analyst knows which
categories of expenditure are necessary.  This paper uses an existing large data set, and an
agnostic approach.  Labor supply are equations are estimated on PSID data using an estimator
which accounts for rationing in the labor market.  The results are used to compute labor market
constraint compensation for comparison to payments under UI systems of representative states.
The results suggest that payments which meet the accepted standard of adequacy would usually
slightly overcompensate individuals.
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Becker (1961), p. 23.1
AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFIT ADEQUACY
I. INTRODUCTION
The traditional approach to evaluating benefit adequacy is to question a sample of UI
recipients about expenditures on a class of goods and services deemed “necessary,” and compare
their level of benefits to these expenses.  Surveys of this type, although extremely valuable, have
proven to be quite expensive.  Becker (1961) noted that for the 1950s benefit adequacy studies
“[t]he time spent per interview averaged about three hours, with a range from one to fourteen
hours, exclusive of the time spent in reinterviews of the more difficult cases.   Results of the1
1950s studies are summarized in Haber and Murray (1966).  Blaustein and Mackin (1977) and
Burgess and Kingston (1978a, 1978b) followed the same basic approach of the earlier studies.
Recently, Cohn and Capen (1987) reported encouraging results from an approach which relied
on household survey data.
While the use of readily available survey data reduces the cost of assembling the necessary
information, a more fundamental problem in the general methodology remains.  All of these
studies presume that the analyst may determine which categories of expenditure are “necessary”
or which items a household may least do without.
The 1950s studies focused on non-deferrable expenses in the categories of food, clothing,
medical care, and housing.  Blaustein and Mackin (1977) added expenditures made on a regular
basis to repay outstanding debt to the 1950s definition and labeled this “recurring” expenses.
Burgess and Kingston (1978a, 1978b) expanded the Blaustein-Mackin definition to include
expenditures on transportation, insurance, regular services, and regular support payments and
called it “necessary and obligated expenses.”  And Cohn and Capen (1987) expand the Bureau
of Employment Security definition of minimum nondeferrable expenditures to include spending
on child care, property taxes, dependents outside the house, transportation, and health.
The problems of sample size and expenditure category selection, are both remedied in the
present study by using a readily available large data set, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), and an agnostic approach to measuring unemployment compensation based on the
economic theory of consumer-worker behavior.  The methodology relies on a natural theoretical
approach to estimating the upper list on unemployment compensation--solve for the lump sum
payment, which, when given to an unemployed individual, makes him indifferent between his
current lot and his pre-unemployment one.
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Burgess, Kingston, and Sloane (1981) endeavored “to assess the feasibility of developing
a benefit adequacy methodology that is based on econometric techniques.”   But “(a)fter a2
substantial amount of experimentation with alternative transformations”  of the variables, they3
concluded that “the benefit adequacy measure analyzed cannot be predicted accurately for
individual beneficiaries on the basis of detailed information about household income and
composition.”   Using a substantially different econometric technique for predicting individual4
UI compensation, this paper reaches a more sanguine result.
In its 1980 statement of policy positions the Interstate Conference of Employment Security
Agencies recommended that “benefits should equal at least half of a beneficiary’s wage.”   The5
same position was enunciated Paul Douglas (1932) during debate over the establishment of a UI
system.  Cohn and Capen (1987) recently applied the one-half wage replacement standard of
adequacy.  The usual methodology has shown this norm to correspond roughly to the fundamental
concern of satisfying the needs of the unemployed.   It has also been demonstrated to be6
consistent with the fiscal integrity of the program.   The present analysis subjects this norm to7
further scrutiny.
II. CONCEPTUAL APPROACH
Satisfaction of each consumer-worker is represented as depending simply on the market
resources at her command, Y, and the time available to enjoy these resources, L.  It is assumed
that each individual, given her exogenous non-labor income, I, and the rate at which we can
transform labor services, H, into income, w, if unconstrained in the labor market, acts in a
manner consistent with the problem:
max ( U(L,Y); Y = xH + I ) = V(L(w,I), Y(w,I)). (1)
L,Y
She reaches an optimum where H(w,I) hours of work are supplied to the market and Y(w,I) goods
are consumed in her residual discretionary time, L(w,I).  Denoting T as the endowment of
discretionary time, L(w,I) = T - H(w,I).  In (1) V(w,I) is the indirect utility function which may
be solved for non-labor income to obtain, I = E(s,V).  The function E(w,V) gives the minimum
3
unearned income necessary to reach the utility level V, given the wage rate w.  Since I =Y - xH,
E(w,V) is referred to as the excess expenditure function, because it determines the minimum lump
sum income in excess of labor earnings needed to achieve a particular level of utility.
In many instances, the effective choice facing a consumer-worker is between working a
standard day, week, or year or not working at all; in other cases an optimal wage-hour
arrangement way be upset by an unexpected layoff.  The analytic techniques required to
investigate the effects of labor market constraints on consumer-worker behavior are formally
similar to the methods used to evaluate the response to “straight rationing.”  Research on the
effects of rationing began during World War II (see Rothbarth 1940-41, Kaldor 1941, and
Nicholson 1942-43) and has continued to be popular (see Tobin-Houthakker 1950-51, Pollack
1971, Neary and Roberts 1980, and Lee and Pitt 1986).
Recently, Ashenfelter (1980) developed a model of household labor supply under
rationing.  This model has been applied by Blundell and Walker (1982), Deaton and Muellbauer
(1981), Kneisner (1976), Parsons (1977), and Ransom (1987).  Ham (1982) presented results
based on a model of individual labor supply under rationing.
If a constraint on labor supply is set at H = H, the problem for the consumer-worker
degenerates. In this situation the level of satisfaction achieved by an individual is:
V* = U(T - H, Y(H, wH + I)) = V(H, I + wH) (2)
Equation (2) may be solved for the sum of non-labor income and exogenous labor income,
I + xH = E(H, V*), (3)
transporting wH, yields the constrained excess expenditure function,
I = E(H, V*) - wH (4)
Two methods to measure the welfare loss experienced by labor market constrained
individuals are developed here.  Variants of the first technique, which is based on the work of
Harberger (1971), have been used by Ashenfelter (1980) and Hurd (1980).  A direct approach
in the spirit of work by Rosen (1978), Hurd and Pencavel (1981), and Abowd and Ashenfelter
(1981) is also investigated.
A Triangle Approximation to Full Compensation
Analytic derivation of a triangle approximation to full unemployment compensation may
be neatly achieved under the Tobin-Houthakker (1950-51) assumption that the ration just bites.
By Shepard’s Lemma, differentiating E(w,V) with respect to the wage rate yields: E(w,V)/ w
4
= E (w,V) = L(w,V) - T = -H(w,V), the negative of the Hicksian labor supply function.w
Where the constraint just bites, H = H(w,V) = -E (w,V), and V=V*.  So that the requiredw
lump sum compensation can be stated as:
C(H, w, V) = E(H, V) - wH - E(w, V) (5)
The difference between the exogenous cost of achieving the unconstrained utility level in the
presence and absence of a ration.  The quantity may also be written:
C(H, w, V) = E(-E (w,V), V) + wE (w, V) - E(w, V). (6)w w
Since it is assumed that V=V*, C( )  0; differentiating (6) with respect to w establishes E/ H-
w = 0, and differentiating a second time with respect to w yields E/ H  = 1/-E .  Therefore,2 2 ww
a second order Taylor Series approximation to C( ) around the fully employed point may be stated
as:
C(H,w,V)  ( E/ H-w)dH + (1/2)( E/ H )(dH)  = (1/2)(dH) /-E . (7)2 2 2 2 ww
And since -E  is the first direct derivative of the compensated labor supply function -E =Sww ww Hw
the substitution effect of a wage change on labor supply.  So that the approximation:
C(H,w,V)  (1/2)(dH) /S (8)2 Hw
is simply one-half the squared duration of unemployment, dH=(H(w,I)-H), divided by the
substitution effect (see Ashenfelter 1980, p. 553).
The triangle approximation to full unemployment compensation (8) is convenient and
likely to be quite accurate when the duration of unemployment is short, but properly the
approximation is correct only when the ration is set at the level that the individual would choose
in the absence of rationing.
An Exact Solution for Full Compensation
If the notion of a representative structure for individual preferences can be accepted, a
method for directly evaluating the required compensation to an individual constrained in selling
labor services is immediate.  The method developed here is based on just such an assumption and
is in the spirit of work by Rosen (1978), who examined the excess burden of income taxation;
Hurd and Pencavel (1981), who evaluated various wage subsidy programs; and Abowd and
Ashenfelter (1981), who examined compensating wage differentials.
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An individual faced with a binding constrain on the hours that he may sell in the labor
market, at, say, H<H(w,I) = T-L(w,I), achieves a utility level less than that atainable in the
absence of labor market rationing,
U(T-H, wH+I) < U(L(w,I), Y(w,I)), (9)
or in terms of the indirect utility function,
V(H, wH+I) < V(w,I) (10)
Full unemployment compensation to an individual who is constrained in selling labor services is
that lump sum grant, , which solves:
U(T-H, wH+I+ ) = U(L(w,I), Y(w,I)). (11)
Stating this condition in terms of the indirect utility function,
V(H, wH+I+ ) = V(w,I), (12)
the nature of  as a Hicksian equivalent variation is obvious.  It is the compensation required by
an individual who is constrained in the labor market to make him as well off as if he were
employed at equilibrium hours.  Therefore
 = (w,I,H) (13)
is the compensation he would need to forego an opportunity to be employed at equilibrium hours.
III. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
The approach to measuring full compensation proceeds from the estimation of a
representative labor supply function.  While only labor supply elasticity estimates are required
to evaluate the triangle approximation to full compensation, to compute the exact solution utility
function parameter estimates are required.
In addition to comparing the approximate and exact approaches to estimating full
compensation, the sensitivity of the compensation estimates to preference structure assumptions
is also examined.  Deriving an explicit closed form solution to (13) is not always an easy matter.
Three utility functions are examined here, they were chosen for their familiarity and tractability.8
They are the Cobb-Douglas (CD), the Stone-Geary (SG) and the Constant Elasticity of
6
Substitution (CES).  By sequentially examining these forms, the effect of relaxing assumptions
on homotheticity and unitary elasticity of substitution are examined.  These utility functions, and
the associated labor supply functions, and compensation formulas are listed in Appendix A.  To
crystallize the approach, one particular case is now worked out in detail.
Exact Compensation in the Linear Expenditure System
The Linear Expenditure System is derived from the Stone-Geary utility function:
U(L,Y) = ln(L- ) + (1- )ln(y- ); 0< , (14)1 2 1
where the parameters  and (1- ) are interpreted as marginal budget shares devoted to leisure and
market goods, and  and  represent leisure and income origin translation parameters1 2
respectively. Maximizing (14) subject to the budget constraint, Y=wH+I, yields leisure demand,
L =  + ( /w)((wT+I) - w  - ), (15a)1 1 2
or labor supply,
H = (T- ) - ( /w)(I+w(T- ) - ), (15b)1 1 2
and commodity demand,
Y =  + (1- )((wT+I) - w  - ), (15c)2 1 2
functions.  Given the adding up condition on neoclassical demand functions, the parameters of
(15a) through (15c) can be determined by estimating the parameters of any one of the demand
system equations.  Denoting the estimated parameter values by the parameters themselves,
substitution of (15a) and (15c) into the right-hand side of (11) yields the right-hand side of
equation (12).
the indirect Stone-Geary utility function.  For this case the left-hand side of (12) is:
Equating (15) and (16) and solving for  yields:
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Denoting the maximum value of the likelihood function when utility is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas as L(CD),9
and using similar notation for other forms, the test statistics are -21n(L(CD)/L(SG)) and -21n(L(CD)/L(CES)).  Each
of these quantities is distributed as a chi-square random variable with one degree of freedom, and each exceed the one
percent critical value of 6.63 by a substantial amount.
a closed form solution for full unemployment compensation when utility is Stone-Geary.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The basic estimation was performed on a sample from Wave XV of the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) survey.  This data was collected in the Spring of 1982, and describes
respondent behavior during 1981.  This particular wave of the PSID was selected since it contains
extensive qualitative information on the presence of labor supply constraints.  This information
was used to classify individuals into one of three groups, underemployed (which includes
unemployed), overemployed, and in equilibrium.  Utility function parameters were estimated
using a generalized Tobit method on explicit labor supply parameterizations.  The sample was
selected from 6,742 respondents to yield a group with characteristics which correspond to the
model of individual consumer-worker behavior.  A description of the characteristics of this
sample is given in Appendix B.
Utility Function Parameter Estimates
The parameter estimates used to perform compensation simulations are reported in Table
1.  They were estimated on a sample of single unattached individuals using data from Wave XV
(1981 data) of the PSID, and a generalized Tobit maximum likelihood method.  The likelihood
function was composed of three parts, one for each possible labor market state: underemployed,
overemployed, and at an equilibrium level of employment.  The estimation was conducted using
the Davidson-Fletcher-Powell algorithm in the GQOPT non-linear optimization program
developed by Goldfeld and Quandt (1972).  All results in this study are based on empirical labor
supply equations which include only variables suggested by the theory.  A complete discussion
of these results, and the technique used to arrive at them, may be found in O’Leary (1986).
Since the forms estimated are generalization of one another, direct tests of the underlying
structure of preferences for the simple labor-leisure choice model may be performed using the
likelihood ratio.  Considering the CD as a restricted version of SG and CES, in both cases the
null hypothesis of CD form can be rejected at the one percent level of significance.   That is to9
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For a summary of these other results see Killingsworth (1982).10
say, both the particular CD type of homotheticity, and unitary elasticity of substitution between
leisure and income may be rejected on the basis of this evidence.  Not surprisingly, more rich
parameterizations fit microeconomic labor supply data better.
Elasticity Estimates
Estimates of the structural Cournot wage effect, income effect, substitution effect, and
associated elasticities are presented in Table 2 for each of the three functional forms.  The results
presented here are based on a combined sample of males and females.  They are broadly
consistent with the results of other “second-generation” research on labor supply.10
For purposes of computing triangle compensation estimates, substitution effect and
elasticity estimates are of paramount importance.  Although familiar and limited in number, the
three forms chosen yield a good variety of reasonable results.  In every case results for these
parameters are consistent with the implication of consumer demand theory that the substitution
effect on labor supply is positive.  Furthermore, in each case leisure is found to be a normal
good.  In the CD case, since H/ w = [ I/w ], the wage elasticity of labor supply is necessarily2
positive; the magnitude of  remains reasonable because of the strong income effect.  TheH.w
origin translation parameters in the SG case dramatically reduce both the income and substitution
effects; SG yields the least elastic results.  In the CES case the substitution effect is insufficient
to dominate the income effect of normal leisure, resulting in a “backward bending”
uncompensated labor supply curve.
Harberger Triangle Compensation Results
Results based on the Harberger triangle approximation are essentially simulation results
where, given the parameter estimates, substitution effects and substitution elasticities are
determined and used to estimate appropriate dollar and replacement rate compensation measures
for various hypothetical degrees of labor market constraint.
In the 1982 Employment and Training Report of the President the U.S. Department of
Labor reported that for the year 1981 (the year to which Wave XV of the PSID data relates)
exactly half of all spells of unemployment experienced had a duration of twelve percent of the
work year (six weeks) or less, while 27.6% were longer than 30% of the year, and 14% were of
sufficient length (27 weeks) to completely exhaust UI benefits for an individual meeting the
requirements for maximum benefit duration in any state of the union.  The Labor Department
figures refer only to actual separation from work.  In the present analysis the magnitude of the
shortfall from desired hours, a more general concept which also covers underemployment
(working fewer than desired hours with no separation from work), is used to measure the degree
9
U.S. Department of Labor 1982, p. 3-1.11
of labor market constraint.  Underemployment is measured here by the constrained shortfall from
“desired” hours, desired hours being estimated by evaluating empirical labor supply functions at
sample mean characteristics.  This estimate of underemployment obviously varies across
functional forms.
Harberger triangle compensation estimates, for degrees of unemployment in 5% (2 week)
increments from five to fifty percent (26 weeks) of the work year, are reported in Table 3.  The
estimates were determined by evaluating C and C*, where C*=C/w dH is the “full” replacementg
ratio, with w  denoting the gross hourly wage rate.  Differentiating C twice with respect to dH,g
the Harberger triangle approximation to “full” dollar compensation is found to be increasing at
an increasing rate in the degree of constraint; a similar operation shows C* to be increasing in
a linear fashion with dH.
While some results are outside the bounds of what seems reasonable, all are reported.  For
D< .5, in the CD and CES cases C* is always less than unity, but generally on the low side
when compared to the standard norm of one-half wage replacement.  For the SG case C* is less
than one only for D< .2, and by the standard norm is excessive for longer durations.
Direct Compensation Simulation Results
Full compensation estimates based on the Direct formulae listed in Appendix A are
presented for various hypothetical degrees of labor market constraint.  These figures are reported
together with UI payment simulation results for three states having benefit computation provisions
which span the variety of systems extant.
Under all state Unemployment Insurance (UI) laws, a claimant’s benefit rights depend on
four principal factors: “the amount of employment and wages required to qualify an individual
for benefits, the period for earning such wages, the method of computing the weekly benefit
amount, and the method of determining the length of time for which benefits may be paid.”11
While the level of wages and period of employment for qualification differ greatly across the
states, there exist only three basic schemes for determining a UI claimant’s weekly benefit
amount.  They are referred to as the Average-weekly-wage, High-quarter, and Annual-wage
formulae.
Results of simple simulations, performed under the assumption of qualification for the
maximum benefit payment period, are presented for state programs representative of each of the
three benefit schemes: Michigan provisions are used to perform Average-weekly-wage
simulations (MI), California laws provide the parameters to do High-quarter simulations (CA),
and Oregon’s scheme is used to generate Annual-wage simulations (OR).  The particulars of the
four categories of benefit rights provisions in each of these states is summarized in Table 4.  In
10
The other ten states without a waiting week in 1981 were: Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky,12
Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
The exceptions (maximum duration in weeks) are: Louisiana (28), Massachusetts (30), Pennsylvania (30),13
Puerto Rico (20), Utah (36), Virginia (28), Washington, DC (34), and West Virginia (28).
the third section of this table the examples highlight the distinguishing characteristics of the three
general benefit schemes.  Under each scheme a formula is employed which yields a weekly
benefit amount (WBA) which is equal to about one-half of lost gross wages.  Under the Michigan
plan seventy percent of the net AWW is paid; in California a fraction between 1/24 and 1/31 of
the HQ earnings is the WBA (the fraction (1/[(24+31)/2]) is used in the California simulation);
and in Oregon the WBA is 1.25 percent of annual income.
Table 5 presents simulation results for all states and preference structures considered.  The
table is divided into three parts, one for each of the three utility functions.  The first column lists
the hypothetical number of weeks of unemployment (WEEK), which ranges from one to twenty-
seven, and then thirty through fifty in increments of five weeks.  The next three columns report
the cumulative benefit payments which would be made to a qualified claimant with the various
weeks of unemployment, and sample average gross hourly wage and CD preference structure in
Michigan, California, and Oregon, respectively.  Column five reports a dollar amount which
equals half of the total gross wages lost, by an individual with the CD preference structure, mean
wage rate, and mean non-labor income.  And the sixth column is the amount of “full”
compensation implied by the closed form direct compensation formula for  in Table A-3.  In1
Michigan there is no waiting period before benefit payments begin.  However, in California and
Oregon the benefit payment is zero during the first full week of unemployment, with this waiting
period acting as a form of coinsurance.  The one-week waiting period was required in all but
eleven states in 1981.   In all states, once benefit payments commence, total benefits increase12
in a linear fashion, with a fixed benefit amount being paid each week, until there is either a return
to work or the claimant is no longer eligible.
It is assumed in the simulations performed here that the stylized claimant considered
qualified for the maximum benefit period of twenty-six weeks.  In the absence of economic
conditions which trigger extended benefits, 26 weeks is the maximum benefit duration under most
UI programs.   As a consequence of the waiting period and the benefit maximums, the figures13
in columns with the headings MI, CA, and OR in the simulation tables are constant for weeks of
unemployment beyond twenty-seven.  Just as the UI benefit totals increase in a linear fashion, so
do the totals for one-half gross wage replacement (HALF).
Differentiating each compensation formula in Table A-3 with respect to H reveals that it
is in general impossible to determine how a change in hours of work affects utility based
compensation.  However for the parameter values estimated, the simulation results suggest that
full compensation is concave in duration.
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Just as for the Harberger triangle approach, the results change substantially when the
homotheticity restriction is relaxed.  The “subsistence” parameters introduced in the SG case
result in a larger share of the discretionary budget, or “supernumerary income,” being devoted
to market goods at the expense of leisure.  Comparing these “full” compensation amounts with
the figures for the actual benefit payments which would be forthcoming in the various states, the
general result for the group of single householders analyzed here is that current UI programs
overcompensate for wage loss in the early phase and, because of the maximum duration
provisions, undercompensate for lengthy spells of unemployment.  The norm of benefit adequacy,
“one-half wage replacement,” is met in the Michigan and Oregon simulations, and nearly satisfied
for the case of California.  This finding is not surprising. Becker (1980) documented the fact that
single individuals with no dependents historically have been adequately compensated for lost
earnings under state UI programs.  In their sample of single persons from the PSID, Cohn and
Capen (1987) find that 85% of non-deferrable expenses are replaced by UI benefits.  Also, only
in California for the cases of SG and CES would an individual with the sample mean wage and
non-labor income not qualify for the maximum WBA.
Table 6 presents the wage replacement ratios (WRR) implicit in the figures reported in
Table 5.  From each of the 3 sections of Table 5, which relate to different utility functions, the
columns labeled MI, CA, OR, and CD, SG, or CES are divided by two times the relevant column
labeled HALF to yield Table 6.  The linear payment schedule, combined with the absence of a
waiting week in Michigan results in a constant WRR.  The presence of a waiting week in
California and Oregon result in a WRR which increases until benefits are exhausted.
Using the approximation that five weeks of unemployment in a given year amounts to a
duration of unemployment, D, of ten percent, for ten weeks D=.20, and so forth the Harberger
triangle compensation estimates may be compared with the closed form estimates of full
compensation.  For unemployment spells of short duration, there is a reasonably close
correspondence.  For long spells the correspondence breaks down.  Overall the direct formulae
yield more reasonable results.
VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Results from estimating explicit parameterizations of labor supply have been used to
compute triangle approximation and direct closed form estimates of labor market constraint
compensation.  Underemployment compensation estimates are generated and compared to
hypothetical payments which would accrue under the UI systems of representative states.  Results
on compensation amounts tend to support accepted standards of UI benefit adequacy.  The
Harberger triangle estimates accord quite closely with the direct compensation estimates when the
duration of unemployment is short, but the direct compensation formulae have a wider range of
applicability.  For all levels of unemployment the direct compensation results indicate that "one-
half gross wage replacement" would slightly over-compensate individuals from a utility based
perspective.
12
The direct compensation and state program simulations imply that current UI programs
overcomepnsate for wage loss during short spells of unemployment, and under-compensate for
lengthy spells.  On net compensation is adequate in the present UI system, but the timing of
payments should be more closely examined.
When evaluating the present results it must be borne in mind that the underlying model
is one of individual behavior, and the entire analysis was performed on a sample of single,
unattached householders.  The analysis was provided reasonable guidelines for future
unemployment insurance policy directed toward this group; for example, increasing coinsurance.
It has also suggested an item for future research in the area of household labor supply.
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Table 1 A Comparison of Maximum Likelihood Utility Function Parameter Estimates for
Various Functional Forms on the Total Samplea






  1 0* 3553.8
(40.9)
0*
  2 0* 662.3
(0.9)
0*
  0* 0* .974
(5.6)
  LY 1* 1* .507
  1073.2 799.4 968.5
  lnL -911.0 -771.2 -845.1
  * Implicitly restricted parameter values.
  T=5840, asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses.  Relying on the invariance property ofa
Maximum Likelihood estimation, estimates of various utility function parameters were
imputed from estimates of other parameters.  Therefore t-values for some parameters are
not reported.
   = The standard error of the Tobit regression equation.
L  = The value of the likelihood function at optimum.
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Table 2. A Comparison of Partial Effect and Elasticity Estimates Implied by Maximum
Likelihood Estimation of Various Functional Forms on the Total Samplea
Form CD SG CES
  Hb 2316.7 2039.5 2134.5
  ( H/ w)c 41.5 4.5 -108.0
  ( H/ I)d -0.12 -0.02 -0.12
  Se 313.8 47.1 148.1
  ( )H.w
f 0.09 0.01 -0.24
  ( )H.I
g -0.09 -0.02 -0.10
  h 0.66 0.11 0.34
 Sample means:  =4.84, I=1709.57, =504.25.a
 H=H( ,I; ); T=5840.b
 ( H/ w) = Cournot wage effectc
 ( H/ I) = pure income effectd
 S = substitution effect = ( H/ w)-H( H/ I)e
 ( ) = wage elasticity = ( H/ w)( /H)f H.w
 ( ) = income elasticity = ( H/ I)(I/H)g H.I
  = substitution elasticity = ( )-( H/I)( )h H.w H.I
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Table 3. Harberger Triangle Full Dollar Compensation and Replacement Ratio Results




C C* C C* C C*
Degree
D=.05 21.4 .04 110.5 .23 38.5 .07
D=.10 85.5 .08 441.8 .46 153.8 .15
D=.15 192.4 .11 999.1 .68 346.1 .22
D=.20 342.0 .15 1767.3 .91 615.2 .29
D=.25 534.4 .19 2761.4 1.14 961.3 .37
D=.30 769.6 .23 3976.5 1.36 1384.2 .44
D=.35 1047.5 .27 5412.4 1.59 1884.1 .51
D=.40 1368.2 .30 7069.3 1.82 2460.9 .59
D=.45 1731.6 .34 8947.1 2.05 3114.5 .66
D=.50 2137.8 .38 11045.8 2.27 3845.1 .74
Degree = D = dH / H( , I; ) = constraint as a fraction of desired hours
C = C(H, w, V)  (1/2)(dH) /S  = dollar compensation amount2 H.w
C* = C/wdH = (1/2)(dH/H(w,I))/  = (1/2)D/ = optimal replacement ratio
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Table 4. Benefit Rights Provisions in the State UI Laws of Michigan, California, and














1st 4 of last 
5 Quarters
Benefit Year (BY) year starting week of
claim
year starting week of
claim
year starting week of
claim
To Qualify:
Earnings 18 x 20 x min wage $1,200 in BP $1,000 in BP
Employment 18 weeks in BP NS 18 weeks in BP
Weekly Benefit 
Amount (WBA)
.7 x Net AWW 1/24 to 1/31 of HQ
earnings
.0125 x AW
Min-Max WBA $41 - $182 $30 - $136 $41 - $158
To Qualify for
Max WBA




















 Source:  U.S. Department of Labor 1982, "Comparison of State Unemployment Insurancea
Laws," Manpower Administration, Unemployment Insurance Service, January.
NS = Not specified in the particular state law.
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Table 5. Direct Full Dollar Compensation Simulation Estimates at Sample Means, and
Simulation Estimates for Unemployment Insurance Compensation in Michigan,
California and Oregon.a

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 These results were generated using mean values of the marginal tax rate (t=.205), the gross wage rate (w =$6.51), and non-labor incomea g
(I=$1709.57) from the total sample of 857 used for the basic estimation.
WEEKS = Annual number of weeks unemployed
MI = Compensation payable in Michigan, an Average Weekly Wage state.
CA = Compensation payable in California, a High Quarter state.
OR = Compensation payable in Oregon, an Annual Wage state.
HALF = Half of lost gross wages
CD = Full compensation at the means given Cobb-Douglas utility
SG = Full compensation at the means given Stone-Geary utility
CES = Full compensation at the means given Constant Elasticity of Substitution utility.
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Table 6 Direct Replacement Ration Simulation Estimates at Sample Means, and Simulation
Estimates for Unemployment Insurance Compensation in Michigan, California,
and Oregona

































































































































































































































































































































































































































 These results were generated using mean values of the marginal tax rate (t=.205), the gross wage rate (w=$6.51),a g
and non-labor income (I=$1709.57) from the total sample f 857 used for the basic estimation.
WEEKS = Annual number of weeks unemployed
MI = Replacement ratio in Michigan, an Average Weekly Wage state.
CA = Replacement ratio in California, a High Quarter state.
OR = Replacement ratio in Oregon, an Annual Wage state.
CD = Replacement ratio given full Cobb-Douglas compensation.
SG = Replacement ratio given full Stone-Geary compensation




Explicit forms for three distinct, but related utility functions, U(L,Y), are presented in
Table A-1, the associated labor supply functions, H(w,I), are stated in Table A-2, and closed
form formulae for full unemployment compensation (w,I, H) are given in Table A-3.
Table A-1 Utility Functions
Cobb-Douglas
U(L, Y; ) = L Y ; 0 <  11-
Stone-Geary
U(L,Y; , , ) = ln(L- ) + (1- )ln(Y- ); 0 <  < 11 2 1 2
Constant Elasticity of Substitution
U(L, Y; , ) = [ (L)  + (1- )(Y) ] ; 0 <  1, and -1 <  < 0 or 0 < , and   0.- - (-1/ )
Table A-2 Labor Supply Functions
Cobb-Douglas
H  = H(w, I; ) = T(1- ) - (I/w)1
Stone-Geary
H  = H(w, I; , , ) = (1- )(T- ) - (I/w) + (1/w)2 1 2 1 2
Constant Elasticity of Substitution
H  = H(w, I; , ) = [ (w) T-I] / [ (w) +w]; 3 LY LY LY
( ) ( )
 = [1/(1+ )], and =[(1- )/ ]LY LY
( )
20
Table A-3 Closed Form Direct Compensation Formulaea
Cobb-Douglas
Stone-Geary
Constant Elasticity of Substitution
 The above three equations are closed form solutions for labor market constraint compensation.a
They are derived in the same fashion as (18) in Section II of the text.  In the equation for , H3




To arrive at a sample of unattached individuals the sample was limited to unmarried
persons (which reduced the sample to 2,888), who lived alone (this reduced the sample to 1,585),
and had no dependents (this reduced the sample to 1,319).  The sample was reduced further due
to labor force status considerations.  Of the 1,319 single householders remaining in the sample,
462 were observed as having a zero hourly wage.  Annual hours of work were also reported as
zero for all but two of these individuals (positive hours for these two may have been due to a
coding error).  The methods developed by Heckman (1974, 1976, 1979) for application to female
labor supply seem natural here; however, of the 460 respondents with zero hours and wages 438
(205 retired, 96 permanently disabled, 4 students, and 133 others), or 95.2 percent, were out of
the labor force in some permanent sense.  The decision was made to restrict analysis to the 857
with positive hours and wages out of the subsample of 1,319.
The analysis is conducted on a sample from a small proportion of the total population, so
the potential for generalizing the results to national levels is limited.  However, as can be seen
in Table B-1, the sample mirrors the growing national population of single householders, in all
respects except race and sex.  Money Income of Households, Families, and Persons in the United
States:  1981 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1983) reports that out of a total of 83.527 million
households in the United States, 19.354 million or 23.2 percent were composed of a single person
in 1981.  While only 13.2 percent of these were minority householders and 38.7 percent were
male, the average gross total income for these single person households was $12,774.  The
sample mean values for age, years of schooling, and extent of unionism compare favorably with
the general working age population.
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Table B-1 Characteristics of the Subsample of 857 Single Householders Selected from the
Wave XV of the PSID
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Description
Hours 1675.27 8.00 5606.00 Hours worked in 1981
Net Wage 4.84 0.14 32.38 Net Hourly Wage Rate
Net Non-labor 1709.57 0.00 29640.00 Net Property Income
Tax Rate 0.21 0.00 0.68 Marginal Tax Rate
Sex 0.47 0.00 1.00 Male=1, Female=0
Age 35.26 17.00 82.00 Age in Years
Education 12.50 0.00 17.00 Years of Schooling
Race 0.60 0.00 1.00 White=1, Else=0
Union 0.14 0.00 1.00 Member=1, Else=0
23
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